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Can a country grow faster by saving more? We address this question both theoretically and
empirically. In our model, growth results from innovations that allow local sectors to catch
up with the frontier technology. In relatively poor countries, catching up with the frontier
requires the involvement of a foreign investor, who is familiar with the frontier technology,
together with eﬀort on the part of a local bank, who can directly monitor local projects to
which the technology must be adapted. In such a country, local saving matters for innovation,
and therefore growth, because it allows the domestic bank to coﬁnance projects and thus
to attract foreign investment. But in countries close to the frontier, local ﬁrms are familiar
with the frontier technology, and therefore do not need to attract foreign investment to
undertake an innovation project, so local saving does not matter for growth. In our empirical
exploration we show that lagged savings is signiﬁcantly associated with productivity growth
for poor but not for rich countries. This eﬀect operates entirely through TFP rather than
through capital accumulation. Further, we show that savings is signiﬁcantly associated with
higher levels of FDI inﬂows and equipment imports and that the eﬀect that these have on
growth is signiﬁc a n t l yl a r g e rf o rp o o rc o u n t r i e st h a nr i c h .
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Can a country grow faster by saving more? The relationship between saving and growth plays
a central role in the neoclassical growth models of Solow (1956) and Cass (1965), Koopmans
(1965) and Ramsey (1928). It also features prominently in the AK models starting with
Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946), and then more recently by Frankel (1962) and Romer
(1986). All these growth models emphasizing capital accumulation as the source of growth,
tell us indeed that higher saving rates should foster growth because higher savings imply
higher capital investment. But these are closed economy models, and extending them to the
case of small open economies with international capital markets would eliminate the eﬀect
of local saving on growth. More recent models emphasizing innovation as the main engine
of growth (Romer, 1990; and Aghion and Howitt, 1992), either ignore capital accumulation,
in which case there is no role for saving even in a closed economy, or they emphasize the
complementarity between capital accumulation and innovation (Howitt and Aghion, 1998),
in which case the equilibrium growth rate depends positively upon domestic saving. But
even in the latter case the theory does not apply to the case of an open economy with capital
mobility.
Thus existing growth theories appear to have little to say about the eﬀect of saving on
growth in the global economy, and yet this question is raised recurrently by policy makers,
for example when discussing the contrast between the high growth in East Asia and the
slow growth in Latin America, two middle-income regions with comparable levels of per
capita GDP in the 1960s. This contrast could hardly be explained by diﬀerences in property
right protection or in ﬁnancial development. Moreover, most Latin American countries have
subscribed to the so-called Washington consensus policies (namely, the idea of combining
macroeconomic stability, trade and ﬁnancial liberalization, and privatization), but so far
to little avail. On the other hand, if one looks at saving rates in the two regions, we do
see a sizeable diﬀerence, with East Asian rates being much higher than Latin American
rates. Speciﬁcally, for the East Asian countries in the sample described in Section 4 below
the average private saving rate from 1960 to 2000 was 25%, whereas for Latin American
countries in the same sample the average saving rate was only 14%.1
In this paper, we develop a theory of local saving and growth in an open economy
with domestic and foreign investors. In our model, growth in relatively poor countries
results mainly from innovations that allow local sectors to catch up with the current frontier
technology. But catching up with the frontier in any sector requires the involvement of a
foreign investor, who is familiar with the frontier technology, together with eﬀort on the part
of a local bank, who can directly monitor local projects to which the technology must be
adapted. Local saving matters for innovation, and therefore growth, because it allows the
domestic bank to coﬁnance projects and thus to attract foreign investment; more speciﬁcally,
coﬁnancing encourages local bank monitoring eﬀort by giving the local bank a stake that it
will lose if the project fails for want of eﬀort on its part, and therefore raises the expected
rate of return to the foreign investor.
1One exception in terms of growth performance in Latin America has been Chile. The average growth
rate of GDP per worker in Chile between 1960 and 2000 has been almost 2 percent a year. Interestingly, its
average saving rate has been 20 percent. See Prescott (2006) for more on the role of savings in the positive
growth experience of Chile.
1The theory also delivers predictions on when domestic saving should matter most for
economic growth. In particular it focuses on the interaction between saving and the country’s
distance to the technological frontier. The main prediction of our model is that saving aﬀects
growth positively in those countries that are not too close to the technological frontier, but
does not aﬀe c ti ta ta l li nc o u n t r i e st h a ta r ec l o s et ot h ef r o n t i e r . T h er e a s o ni st h a t
in a relatively poor country higher saving increases the number of projects that can be
coﬁnanced by the local bank on terms that give the bank an incentive to monitor while
guaranteeing a suﬃcient share of proﬁts for a foreign investor to participate. However, in
countries suﬃciently close to the frontier the local ﬁrms are more likely themselves to be
familiar with the frontier technology, and therefore do not need to attract foreign investment
in order to undertake an innovation project; in such a case every ex ante proﬁtable innovation
project will be undertaken regardless of the level of domestic saving because there is no need
for coﬁnance when there is just one agent participating in the project.
In the second part of the paper, we confront the above theory with empirical evidence.
Houthakker (1961, 1965), Modigliani (1970) and Carroll and Weil (1994) have shown that
t h e r ei sal a r g ea n dh i g h l ys i g n i ﬁcant positive correlation between saving and growth in the
cross-section of countries. However, there is little agreement as to how one should interpret
this correlation. Given the diﬃculty of providing a causal link from saving to growth in a
world of capital mobility, several observers have sought to explain the correlation as reﬂecting
an eﬀect of growth on saving. But this interpretation runs counter to mainstream economic
theory in which the representative household’s consumption-Euler equation implies that
growth should have a negative eﬀect on saving. Thus for example Carroll, Overland and
Weil (2000) depart from convention by developing a model of habit persistence which they
argue is consistent with a wide body of evidence to the eﬀect that increases in growth precede
increases in saving.
In our empirical exploration we provide evidence of the causal link running from saving
to growth, namely the one that our theory implies should operate even in a world of capital
mobility. We ﬁrst explore various case studies of Asian countries. In the growth episodes of
these countries, we observe the importance of policies that tried to increase private savings
to provide liquidity to the banking system. Further, the liquidity of the domestic banking
system helped attract foreign investors that brought in the frontier technology that triggered
TFP and productivity growth. After this informal exploration, we explore econometrically
the reduced form predictions of the model and its mechanisms. Speciﬁcally, using the within
country variation in a panel of 118 countries over the 1960-2000 period, we show that the
average saving rate in the last ﬁve years positively aﬀects growth in productivity during the
decade going forward in poor countries, while in rich countries the eﬀect is smaller and often
not signiﬁcant. In line with the model, private saving is entirely responsible for the eﬀect
of saving on growth. Further, the connection between lagged saving and subsequent growth
operates exclusively through TFP growth. This ﬁnding is relevant because it diﬀerentiates
our model from others that emphasize a connection between saving and future investment
through the ﬁnancial accelerator (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989).
To gain further insight into the mechanisms that drive the connection between saving and
growth, we explore the relationship between FDI, equipment imports, saving and growth.
We ﬁnd that lagged average saving is highly correlated with FDI and equipment import
intensity, especially in poor countries where both FDI and equipment imports enter positive
2and signiﬁcantly in the panel growth regressions. In addition, the inclusion of either FDI
or equipment investment reduces signiﬁcantly the estimated eﬀect of lagged savings on the
productivity growth and the TFP growth of poor countries but not in rich countries.
Coﬁnancing is formally equivalent to posting collateral. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and
Garber (2004) also stress the role of collateral in the growth process of some countries.
Speciﬁcally, they argue that capital ﬂows from poor to rich countries may partly reﬂect poor
countries’ choices to transfer wealth to a “center or reserve currency country” in order to
make it easier for foreigners to get their hands on that wealth should the poor countries
expropriate the foreigners’ capital; this in turn should encourage foreign direct investment
in poor countries, thereby fostering development. However, Dooley et al. do not explore
this idea in the context of a full-ﬂedged endogenous growth model. Nor do they analyze
its implications for the relationship between local saving and growth across countries with
diﬀerent levels of technological development.
Our theory relates not only to the growth literature but also to an important debate in
international ﬁnance around the so-called “Lucas puzzle”, namely why poorer countries or
regions, where capital is scarce and therefore the marginal productivity of capital should
be high, do not attract investments that would make them converge towards the frontier
countries or regions. Lucas (1990) points to the role of human capital externalities that would
favor capital investments in richer countries. However, Gertler and Rogoﬀ (1990), and more
recently Banerjee and Duﬂo (2005), point to the importance of contractual imperfections
(whether these result from local contractual enforcement problems or from ex ante moral
hazard on the part on local investors). Gertler and Rogoﬀ provide supporting evidence in
favor of the contracting explanation, in particular the positive and signiﬁcant correlation
between the volume of private external debt and the log of per capita income in a cross-
country regression. More recent evidence in Alfaro et al (2003) to the eﬀe c tt h a tp r i v a t e
lending by foreign investors is correlated with various institutional indicators, in particular
with a lower degree of corruption, is consistent with the contracting explanation, as is the
evidence in Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) that poorer countries exhibit a higher rate of defaults
on their foreign debt. The relationship between ﬁnancial constraints and foreign investment
ﬂows is also emphasized in recent work by Antras, Desai and Foley (2005) that explains why
we observe large and two-way FDI ﬂows between countries with high levels of development,
whereas capital ﬂows between countries with uneven degrees of ﬁnancial development are
small and unbalanced. Also closely related to our analysis in this paper is Alfaro et al
(2004) which shows, based on a cross-country sample, that FDI is more positively correlated
with growth in countries with higher ﬁnancial development. Our paper contributes to this
literature by developing an endogenous growth model that shows how local saving impacts
on foreign investment and thereby on growth in an economy with contractual frictions, and
by confronting the predictions of this model with cross-country panel data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model embodying our theory and
derives the prediction to the eﬀe c tt h a ts a v i n gh a sap o s i t i v ee ﬀect on growth in all but the
most technologically advanced countries. Section 3 discusses anecdotal evidence from East
Asia. Section 4 presents our empirical evidence. Section 5 concludes.
32 A simple model
2.1 Basic environment
We consider a discrete-time model of a small open economy, populated by two-period lived
individuals. Individuals work and save when young to invest in innovation and consume
when old, and we denote by σ their saving rate when young. Instead of modelling saving as
resulting from intertemporal utility maximization we simply take σ as given.
A ﬁnancial intermediary (a bank) can use local savings to attract foreign investment. (It
cannot use foreign savings because of the diﬃculty that foreigners would have in monitoring
the local bank.) The bank can monitor innovation projects, and we implicitly assume that
it cannot monitor foreign projects; conversely, foreign banks ﬁnanced with foreign savings
are unable to monitor local projects.
T h e r ei sau n i q u eﬁnal good, which is produced using labor and a continuum of interme-










where L is the supply of labor, taken as an exogenous constant, and Ait is the productivity
of the current input i at time t.
Intermediate goods are produced by local monopolists, using ﬁn a lg o o da sc a p i t a lw i t h
one unit of capital producing one unit of intermediate input. The amount of intermediate
input xit is chosen by producer i to maximize monopoly proﬁts
pitxit − xit











with equilibrium proﬁts equal to
πit = α(1 − α)κ
αLAit ≡ θAit.
Moreover, assuming perfect competition in the labor market yields an equilibrium wage:




0 Aitdi is average productivity.2
2Substituting from the above expression for xit back into the aggregate production function shows that
per-capita GDP is strictly proportional to productivity:
yt/L = καAt.
42.2 Innovation technology
Our theory of productivity growth takes into account that every sector in every economy
has access to a global stock of technological knowledge. As in Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes
(2005), we assume that local ﬁrms can access the frontier technology on their own, although
at a cost which increases with the distance between the local and the frontier productivities.
In addition, we introduce the possibility for local entrepreneurs to turn to a foreign investor
who has mastered the frontier technology in order to access that technology at a potentially
lower cost. Both accumulated savings and the country’s distance to the technological frontier
will aﬀect the feasibility or the attractiveness of this latter type of arrangement relative to
the former innovation technology.
Suppose accordingly that at any point in time in each sector there is one old person who
can act as the local entrepreneur, and who has the potential to displace the incumbent by
innovating and thus being able to produce a superior intermediate product in that sector.
Speciﬁcally, a successful innovator in any sector i can produce with a productivity parameter
At that embodies the current global frontier technology. Suppose that the frontier technology
At grows at the constant rate g, which depends on the pace of innovation in the richest
countries. (For our purposes we can take g as given.)
There are three inputs to the innovation process: ﬁrst, a costless input from a local entre-
preneur; second, an unobservable eﬀort e on the part of the bank to monitor the entrepreneur
and make sure she does not run away with the money; and third, an investment f that is
needed to transfer the frontier technology. To innovate, the entrepreneur must undertake a
project, either with a foreign investor or without.
2 . 2 . 1 I n n o v a t i o nw i t haf o r e i g ni n v e s t o r
If the entrepreneur undertakes a project with a foreign investor, then the probability μ that






μ if f ≥ f min
t and e =1
μ if f ≥ f min




μ > μ = qμ > 0,
with μ being the actual probability of innovation and q<1 being the probability that the





denotes the minimum investment that must be made by the foreign investor at date t for
that sector to innovate with positive probability.
The cost of the investment f is just f itself. The cost Ct of monitoring by the bank in a
given sector is proportional to the frontier level of productivity:
Ct = e · (c/u) · At,
5where c is a random variable, independently and identically distributed across sectors, uni-
formly between zero and one, and u is a (positive) parameter that measures the eﬃciency of
ﬁnancial intermediation.
We also assume that the bank’s monitoring eﬀo r tc a n n o tb eo b s e r v e db ya n y o n ee l s e .
This means that the bank will choose to shirk on monitoring a project, setting e =0 , unless
it has enough at stake in the success of the project. As we show below, this implies that
it may have to coﬁnance the foreign investment f, or equivalently to post collateral which
accrues to the foreign investor in the event the project does not succeed.
2.2.2 Innovation without a foreign investor
If the entrepreneur undertakes a project without a foreign investor, then she does not need
any monitoring eﬀort, since she is not going to run away from herself. In this case the
probability of success is just the probability of innovation, μ. Assume that the cost of the
investment f, which must be undertaken by the entrepreneur herself, depends inversely upon
how familiar she is with frontier technology last period, which in turn we assume depends
positively on how close the country was to the frontier last period. That is, the cost is:
(φ/ψ(at−1))At
where at−1 measures the country’s distance to the frontier:
at−1 ≡ At−1/At−1,
and ψ is a continuous function with:
ψ
0 (a) > 0, ψ(0) = 0 and ψ(1) = 1.
2.3 Equilibrium innovation
Let Vt denote the value of an innovation at date t. Since the entrepreneur is in her last
period of life, under the simplifying assumption that in the event of no innovation next
period control of the incumbent ﬁrm will fall randomly to someone of the next generation,
the monopoly rents from a successful innovation will last for one period only, so we have:
Vt = θAt.
We then make the following assumptions:
1. Innovation at rate μ is always worth the innovation cost when undertaken with a foreign
investor, even when the monitoring cost is at its maximal value 1/u:
μθ − φ ≥ 1/u, (1)
2. No innovation project is worth the innovation cost without the local bank’s monitoring:
μθ < φ.
6The equilibrium rate of innovation in the economy at date t will equal the innovation
probability μ times the fraction of sectors λt in which a project is undertaken. To determine
λt, ﬁrst note that a project undertaken without a foreign investor will yield a non-negative
expected return to the entrepreneur (μθ −φ/ψ(at−1) ≥ 0) if and only if the country is close





Accordingly every entrepreneur will undertake a project when a country is closer than b a to
the frontier, so:
λt =1 if a ≥ b a. (A1)
In a country further from the frontier, with a<b a, the only projects that will be under-
taken are those that involve a foreign investor. The fraction λt will be the fraction of sectors
in which a project could possibly yield non-negative expected surpluses to the bank, the
entrepreneur and the foreign investor, while at the same time giving the bank an incentive
to monitor. For purposes of determining λt we assume with no loss of generality that all
the expected surplus accrues to the bank, with the entrepreneur receiving nothing and the
foreign investor receiving precisely the opportunity cost of that part of his investment f that
is not ﬁnanced by the bank.
The expected surplus to the bank on a given project with a foreign investor equals
(S − c/u)At
where the “primary surplus” S is deﬁned as:
S = μθ − φ
Condition (1) above guarantees that the expected surplus is always positive, and hence that
all investors can receive a non-negative expected surplus. Hence λt will be the fraction of
projects on which the bank can be given an incentive to monitor.
Whether or not the bank has an incentive to monitor a particular project will depend
on how much of the initial cost φ it has ﬁnanced. Consider a project in which the bank has
ﬁnanced the amount yAt, and the foreign investor has put up the remaining (φ − y)At.L e t
xAt (resp. (θ − x)At) denote the foreign investor’s (resp. the bank’s) reward in the event
of a successful innovation in the corresponding sector. The bank’s incentive-compatibility
constraint is:
(μ − μ)(θ − x) ≥ c/u
That is, the increased expected payoﬀ cannot be less than the monitoring cost. This can be
turned into a constraint on the amount of ﬁnance yAt by taking into account our assumption
that the expected surplus of the foreign investor [μx − (φ − y)]At equals zero:
y ≥− S + ∆ · (c/u) (2)






The right-hand side of (2) shows the minimum coﬁnancing (normalized by At)t h a tn e e d s
to be made by the local bank in order for a project to be undertaken with a foreign investor.
The maximum coﬁnancing she can provide in total across all sectors is equal to:
σωAt−1
where ω is the productivity-adjusted wage rate derived above. A higher saving rate σ will
thus facilitate innovation by allowing the bank to coﬁnance more projects. If total ﬁnance
is a constraint, then the bank will ﬁnance all projects up to some threshold value of c (since
lower monitoring costs yield a higher expected surplus to the bank and use up less ﬁnancing
according to (2)). That threshold will be the fraction λt of projects that are undertaken,
given that c is uniformly distributed over the unit interval.
In sectors where the eﬀort variable c is less than
c = uS/∆
no coﬁnancing is required by the incentive-compatibility constraint (2); all such projects will












in which the two sides represent respectively the amounts of ﬁnance required and available,
both normalized by At. Solving the integral and making use of the above deﬁnition of c
yields:
λt = c + k
√
cσat−1 if a<b a. (A2)
where k is a constant.5.
According to (A1) and (A2), when a country is close to the frontier saving has no eﬀect
on innovation because local ﬁnance is not needed to attract foreign investment, whereas
when the country is far enough from the frontier the saving rate σ increases innovation by
increasing the number of projects for which local ﬁnance can attract foreign investment.
2.4 Equilibrium dynamics and theoretical predictions




At with probability μ
Ait−1 with probability 1 − μ
,
4For simplicity we assume that λt ≤ 1. Relaxing this assumption would strengthen our result because
it would add another reason why increased saving would have no eﬀect on a country close enough to the
frontier (in this case close enough that the solution to the integral equation is λt > 1); that is, when






S (1 + g)
8whereas sectors that do not undertake a project do not grow. Integrating over i,w eﬁnd
that aggregate productivity evolves according to:
At = λtμAt +( 1− λtμ)At−1.









This “distance” equation describes the current dynamic evolution of the country’s distance to
the world technological frontier, given the current fraction of sectors λt that have undertaken
an investment project and hence are capable of innovating with positive probability.













We are also interested in the relationship between the saving rate and the total amount
of FDI, namely
fλt.
Proposition 1 (i) The eﬀects of a higher saving rate σ on total FDI and on growth are
both strictly positive when at−1 < b a and zero otherwise; (ii) for at−1 < b a, t h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect
of σ on growth increases with u and decreases with at−1.
























which is increasing in u (since c is proportional to u) and decreasing in at−1.
Part two of this proposition is fairly intuitive. A more eﬃcient ﬁnancial system (larger
u) is going to make better use of any increased saving. On the other hand, even though
being closer to the frontier increases the normalized productivity at−1 on which saving is
based, diminishing returns to saving (because c increases on the margin) means that this
eﬀect on the economy-wide frequency of innovations λtμ is oﬀset by the reduced average size
of innovations (
1+g
at=1 − 1), which falls more than in proportion to at−1.
Thus: in a country that is not too close to the frontier, growth and FDI respond positively
to an increase in the domestic saving rate, whereas in a country close enough to the frontier
growth is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by saving; moreover, the positive eﬀect of savings on
growth is enhanced by a higher degree of ﬁnancial development. It is these predictions that
we shall explore in the next section.
93 Anecdotal evidence from East-Asia
Before presenting formal econometric evidence in support of the model’s predictions and
mechanisms in the next section, it is illustrative to study the process of technology upgrading
with the help of some case studies drawn from East-Asian experience.6
J a p a ni nt h ep o s tW W Ip e r i o d
Japan during the post WWI period illustrates (i) the importance of foreign involvement
for catching up with the technology frontier, (ii) the relevance of domestic savings for provid-
ing liquidity to the banking sector and (ii) how this ﬁnancial liquidity enables transactions
with foreign technology suppliers.
Most of the new technology implemented in Japanese manufacturing during the 1920s
was of foreign origin. In many sectors, the usual practise was to buy the technology from a
domestic supplier and then to try to reverse engineer it. Technology transfer also took the
form of foreign direct investment. Most of the FDI was in capital and technology intensive
industries such as machinery, electrical goods, steel and iron goods, and rubber goods. In
these cases, a foreign ﬁrm would either set up a fully owned subsidiary or it would enter in
aj o i n tp a r t n e r s h i pw i t ha ne x i s t i n gJ a p a n e s eﬁrm. These joint partnerships provided the
Japanese ﬁrms with the technology and capital they lacked to make a further expansion.7
By 1931, 50.5 percent of foreign direct investment was already in the form of joint en-
terprises.8 Japan in the 1920s lacked a broad stock market for publicly issued securities.
Individual savings were mobilized in the form of bank deposits. Big Japanese manufacturing
ﬁrms overcame the lack of ﬁnancial markets by forming conglomerates that also controlled
big banks and trust companies. This provided ample liquidity to ﬁrms in metallurgy, equip-
ment, chemicals, etc., that required large amounts of capital. In particular, this organi-
zational arrangement allowed the ﬁrms that required more capital to access the individual
savings deposited in the banks. As it turned out, heavy industry sectors were at the center of
the ﬁnancial conglomerates and also were the ones that received foreign technology transfer
through joint partnerships (Islam, 1960).
Korea in the 1960s
When Park took oﬃce in 1962, Korea was emerging from the 1958-62 recession period
where inﬂation had been high. In an eﬀo r tt or e d u c eh i g hi n ﬂation the government instituted
6Of course, the mechanisms emphasized by our model hold more generally, as shown for example by
Nicholas (1974). This author conducted a study that covered 27 small- and medium-sized manufacturing
enterprises in Ghana and Senegal, two countries that are far from the technological frontier. He interviewed
the managers in each ﬁrm and asked them about the process of technology upgrading. In most cases, suc-
cessful upgrading involved the help of foreign technicians that trained workers and guided local entrepreneurs
in acquiring machines. Though not covered by this study, the help of foreign entreprenurs and investors is
surely even more relevant for upgrading technology in large enterprises.
7“As a matter of fact, the resort to foreign partnerships was most of the time precisely for technological
innovation in ﬁelds in which the Japanese did not have the adequate knowledge or resources.” Islam (1960)
8This surge of joint partnerships with foreign ﬁrms started long before 1932 when the new military regime
imposed a minimum Japanese share in foreign corporations operating in Japan.
10the 1965 interest rate reform. The government central bank oﬀered depositor rates of 20 per-
cent on savings accounts, a dramatic increase over the existing rates of 12 percent (Kuznets,
1977). In 1965 the inﬂation rate was 19 percent. As a result, the real return on savings
was negative before the interest rate reform. The increase in interest rates raised savings
both because it increased the nominal rate and because the decline in demand reduced the
inﬂation rate. As a result of the reform, deposits more than doubled and they increased
twelve-fold by 1972.
It is during the period 1962-66 that the ﬁr s tn o t i c e a b l ee ﬀorts were made on the part
of local authorities to attract foreign direct investment. These ﬁrst took the form of new
laws that allowed for temporary tax holidays, for duty-free import of machinery and raw
materials approved as investment requirements, for the remittance of principals and proﬁts
and that protected property against expropriation. In addition, various measures aimed
at promoting exports made it more attractive for foreign investors to transfer technology
(Westphal, 1978). And in those, local credit featured prominently. First, credit subsidies
provided low interest loans to exporters with letters of credit from foreign importers. These
credit lines provided liquidity to producers of goods that were suﬃciently competitive to
be exported. This facilitated the provision of collateral by domestic producers to foreign
investors that helped them upgrade their technology. Second, the Korean Exchange Bank
also provided suppliers’ credit. Foreign suppliers of plant, equipment and raw materials
to Korean exporters provided the largest source of funds for export. The credits and loans
provided by these foreign suppliers were secured by the Korean Exchange Bank. These credit
policies in turn could be sustained thanks to the large amount of private savings deposited
in the government’s Bank in response to the interest rate reform. These clearly helped solve
the moral hazard problem raised by the international transfer of technology.
Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s
Taiwan oﬀers a very similar picture to Korea with just a few important diﬀerences with
respect to the development of ﬁnancial markets. Taiwan showed a remarkable saving rate at
least since the early 50s. Despite very low income per capita levels ($100 in 1950) and coming
out of hyperinﬂation (annual percentage inﬂation rates of 3400, 305, 66 and 23 between 1949
and 1952), the saving rate in 1952 was as high as 9.2 percent. As in Korea in the early 1960s,
the government promoted saving by pursuing a high interest rate policy. This interest rate
policy also led to a reduction in inﬂation which induced a further increase in the real interest
rate. The real interest rate averaged 17 percent between 1952 and 1958. In addition, private
savings were indirectly promoted by the government through complementary policies such
as a very low social security safety net, a limited availability of consumer credit, high down
payments for housing and a variety of favorable tax policies (Chiu 1992, Myers 1984, and
Stallings 1990). These policies resulted in an impressive increase in the saving rate, from 12
percent in 1962 to 22 percent in 1968 and 35 percent in 1973.
The Taiwanese ﬁnancial system is dominated by the government-controlled local commer-
cial banks and by the Central Bank which provide credit mostly to large ﬁrms. In addition,
small businesses could obtain resources from the “curb market”: “an unregulated, semi-legal
credit market in which loan suppliers and lenders can transact freely at uncontrolled interest
rates.” (Wade, 1985).
11Taiwan’s link to international markets was restricted by the stringent capital controls that
were in place until the 1980s. The exception to this rule was FDI. In the early 1970s, one ﬁfth
of manufacturing production came from fully or partially foreign-owned ﬁrms. FDI has been
concentrated in a few advanced manufacturing sectors. For example, between 1952 and 1979,
two thirds of FDI in Taiwan was concentrated in Electronics (48 percent) and Chemicals (15
percent). Foreign ﬁrms played a major role in the development of these industries and
helped upgrade the technologies used in these industries for example by producing advanced
synthetics (Clark, 1997).
One example of successful technology transfer is the case of the Singer Sewing Machine
Company that revolutionized the local industry in Taiwan. Before Singer arrived in Taiwan
in 1963, the sewing machine industry consisted of approximately 250 family-owned ﬁrms
assembling sewing machines and providing parts for the assemblers. Taiwan Singer started
production in 1964. It provided considerable technical assistance to its local suppliers, fur-
nishing them with blueprints, providing training and technology transfer in production,
quality control, factory management and in standardizing parts. These gave a tremendous
impulse to the local producers, both to the suppliers that dealt directly with Singer and
to the rest which were able to improve their technologies by interacting with Signer’s di-
rect suppliers. This resulted in a ﬁfteen-fold increase in production between 1963 and 1973.
Furthermore, while Taiwan Singer played a major direct role in the initial increase in pro-
duction, domestic ﬁrms soon dominated both the domestic and export markets. After 1968,
Taiwan Singer’s share of Taiwanese production dropped to about 10 percent. The upgrading
of Taiwanese technology to the world frontier occurred very quickly. The resources to ﬁnance
the technological upgrading for the hundreds of small domestic ﬁr m sc a m em o s t l yf r o mt h e
curb market which was fed by-and-large by domestic private savings.
However, the lack of an eﬃcient formal ﬁnancial market in Taiwan has been a constraint
for the acquisition of technologies that, because of the size of the necessary foreign invest-
ments, required larger amounts of collateral to enable the transfer. This was the case in the
automobile industry. All the various projects that were attempted to upgrade the automo-
bile industry did not pass the planning stage. Though the threat of foreign entry stimulated
domestic producers to become more productive, these remained far from becoming interna-
tionally competitive.
4E c o n o m e t r i c e v i d e n c e
We now confront the implications of our model to more formal empirical analysis. Our
exploration is based on a cross-country panel over the period from 1960 to 2000. We use a
sample of 118 countries, all those for which there exist data on per-worker GDP and on the
saving rate. Data on income per worker comes from the Penn World Tables 6.1. For the
saving rate we use both the series from the Penn World Tables and from the World Bank.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis.
The main empirical implications of our model concern the diﬀerential eﬀect of savings on
growth for countries that are far from the technology frontier (i.e. a<b a). To implement the
test of this prediction, we classify countries each year in two groups depending on whether
t h el o g - i n c o m eg a pw i t ht h eh i g h e s ti n c o m ep e rc a p i t ac o u n t r yi sa b o v eo rb e l o wt h em e d i a n
12gap (i.e. 1.8).
We start our analysis by estimating regression (4). In this speciﬁcation, the dependent
variable is the growth rate of income per worker over a rolling interval between year t and
year t+10. We choose a diﬀerence of ten years because the mechanism emphasized above is
more likely to be relevant in the medium term than in the short term.
ln(yit+10/yit)/10 = αi + ρ t + β lnyit + γsit,t−4 + ²it. (4)
The independent variable of interest is the average saving rate in the ﬁve-year period
between t−4 and t denoted by sit,t−4. The saving rate variable, which includes public as well
as private saving, is deﬁned as one minus the ratio of private consumption to GDP minus
the ratio of government purchases to GDP. Using a ﬁve-year average of savings instead of
t h ea n n u a ls a v i n gr a t ea tt serves three purposes. First, it reduces the measurement error
present in annual data. Second, it better captures the notion that collateral is a stock not a
ﬂow. We will explore below the robustness of the results to allowing for longer periods over
which savings are accumulated. Third, by using lagged measures of the independent variable
we reduce the possibility of reverse causality. Of course, the ideal empirical counterpart to
the saving rate in the model would be some measure of collateralizable domestic assets.
Unfortunately, this variable is unavailable for a panel such as ours and we have to use a
noisy proxy such as the average saving rate for the last 5 years.
In our regressions, we follow the convergence literature (and equation (3)) and allow
for the initial log-level of income per worker (lnyit)t oh a v ea ne ﬀect on the subsequent
growth rate. We also include a time trend and country ﬁxed eﬀects to control for trends
and very persistent diﬀerences in productivity growth driven by factors not captured by our
theory. Below we also check for the robustness of the estimates to including year ﬁxed eﬀects
that capture global annual ﬂuctuations in the variables. Our empirical strategy consists in
estimating regression (4) for three samples, the sample of all countries, the sample of poor
countries and the sample of rich countries. Therefore, the speed of convergence and the time
trends may in principle diﬀer by income group.
Since the periods used to compute the growth rate of income per capita and the saving
rates overlap, the error terms may be autocorrelated. We use the Newey-West method to
obtain correct standard errors for the estimated coeﬃcients. To obtain some guidance on
the length of the autocorrelation polynomial for the error terms, we apply the Akike and
Bayesian information criteria to all regressions we run; both of these criteria lead us to use
an AR(1) structure for the error term. The statistical signiﬁcance of our results, however, is
robust to specifying much longer polynomials for the error terms.
The ﬁrst three columns in Table 2 report the estimates from (4) in our three samples.
Column 1 covers all the country-years; column 2 restricts the sample to country-year pairs
above the median income gap, that is, poor countries, while column 3 restricts the sample
to rich countries. In the full sample we observe the standard result of convergence in income
per worker after introducing country ﬁxed eﬀects. As predicted by our model, we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant positive association between savings and productivity growth in the ten years
going forward.
A more interesting prediction of our model is that the eﬀect of savings on growth should
be larger for countries far from the technology frontier than for countries close to the frontier.
13This prediction is borne by the data. Comparing the coeﬃcients of savings in columns 2 and
3 we can observe how for poor countries the coeﬃcient of savings in the growth regression is
3.9 percent while for rich countries is less than half this magnitude. The association between
lagged average savings and productivity growth for poor countries is very signiﬁcant while for
rich countries the t-statistic is just 1.67. Further, the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcient of savings
between the two samples is statistically signiﬁcant. This is illustrated in the last row which
reports the p-value from the test of the null that the estimated eﬀect of lagged savings on
growth is the same in the samples of rich and poor countries. Note also that the estimated
eﬀect of lagged savings on growth is of quantitative importance. An increase in the average
saving rate between t−4 and t of 10 percentage points is associated with an increase in the
a v e r a g eg r o w t hr a t ei no u t p u tp e rw o r k e ro ff o u rt e n t h so fo n ep e r c e n t a g ep o i n to v e rt h e
next ten years.
The remaining six columns in Table 2 check the robustness of these results. Columns 4
through 6 report the estimates of the following regression where the time trends are replaced
by year ﬁxed eﬀects.
ln(yit+10/yit)/10 = αi + ρt + β lnyit + γsit,t−4 + ²it. (5)
Including year ﬁxed eﬀect does not aﬀect much the estimated association between lagged
average savings and subsequent productivity growth. The coeﬃcients of savings decline a
little both for rich and poor countries but the one for poor countries remains very signiﬁcant
and the gap between the two persists after the inclusion of the time dummies.
C o l u m n s7t h r o u g h9o fT a b l e2i n c l u d ea sc o n t r o lt h ed e g r e eo ft r a d eo p e n n e s si nt h e
economy at year t measured by the sum of the exporta n dt h ei m p o r ts h a r e si nG D P . This
variable has been identiﬁed by several authors (including Frankel and Romer, 1999) as an
important determinant of growth. In line with their results, we ﬁnd that it is signiﬁcantly
associated with subsequent growth. However, its inclusion does not aﬀect the relationship
between savings and growth. In particular, lagged average savings is strongly associated
with productivity growth in the whole sample and in the sample of poor countries while it
is not signiﬁcantly associated with growth in the sample of rich countries.
Private vs. public savings
In our model, savings matter only because of their role as coﬁnancing or collateral when
undertaking technology adoption projects with a foreign investor. If public savings can be
used as collateral by private agents, then the model predicts that the eﬀect of private and
public savings should have a symmetric eﬀect on growth. However, if public savings cannot
be used as collateral for private projects, then the mechanisms presented in the model imply
that private savings should have a stronger eﬀect on growth than public savings. Further, to
the extent that government savings constitute a transfer of resources away from the private
economy and this may reduce private savings, our model may predict a negative eﬀect of
public savings in countries far from the technology frontier but no eﬀect in countries more
familiar with the frontier.
Next, we explore whether the positive association that we have found between lagged
savings and productivity growth operates through private or public savings. To do that, we
use World Bank data on savings that divides these between private and public. These data
14also allow us to check the robustness of the results presented in Table 2 to using the World
Bank savings measures instead of the Penn World Table’s.
The ﬁrst three columns in Table 3 reestimate regression (4) with the World Bank savings
measures. The basic message from this exercise is that the diﬀerential eﬀect of savings on
growth for poor countries is robust to the savings data used. Indeed, the point estimate of
savings of the eﬀect of lagged savings on growth for poor countries is very similar to the one
reported in Table 2 (3.3 vs. 3.9 percent). The t-statistic however declines slightly (from 2.6
to 1.87) because of the substantial reduction in the sample size (from 1781 to 684) when
using the World Bank savings data.
After showing that the diﬀerential eﬀect of savings on growth for poor countries is robust
to the savings data using, we explore whether this association is driven by private or by
public savings. Columns 4 through 6 estimate regression (6), where we allow for diﬀerent
coeﬃcients on the growth eﬀects of average lagged private savings over GDP (sprivWB
it,t−4)
and average lagged public savings over GDP (spubWB
it,t−4).




it,t−4 + ²it. (6)
The main ﬁnding from this exercise is that the diﬀerential eﬀect of savings on growth for
countries that are far from the frontier is completely driven by private rather than public
savings. A ten percentage points increase in the average private saving rate of poor countries
between t − 4 and t is associated with more than a half a percent increase in the average
productivity growth rate during the following decade. In contrast, the point estimate of the
eﬀect of public savings on growth is negative but insigniﬁcant.
Capital accumulation vs. TFP growth
Productivity growth can result from TFP growth and from capital accumulation. In
particular, if the aggregate production function takes the standard Cobb-Douglas form we
can decompose the productivity growth measure over a ten year period that we have been
using as dependent variable so far as follows
ln(yit+10/yit)/10 = ln(TFP it+10/TFPit)/10 + α ∗ ln(kit+10/kit)/10, (7)
where k denotes capital per worker.
In our model, savings has a larger growth eﬀect for poor than for rich countries because
it allows them to build the collateral necessary to involve foreign investors that are familiar
with the technology frontier in the domestic projects. This foreign input leads the poor
country to grow because enables the adoption of state of the art technology. Therefore, an
essential feature of the model is that the growth eﬀect of lagged savings in poor countries
operates through TFP growth. This implication is in sharp contrast with most existing
models of savings and growth (Solow, 1956, Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) which predict that
the growth eﬀects of savings operate through capital accumulation.
To explore which channel is driving the relationship between savings and productivity
growth, we build measures of the growth in capital per worker over ten year intervals (t,
t +1 0 )using investment rates from the World Development Indicators and data on the
number of workers from the Penn World Tables. As it is customary in the literature (i.e.
15Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992), we assume that the depreciation rate is the same across
countries. Then, we compute TFP growth over a ten year interval by assuming a capital
share of one third and subtracting one third times the growth rate of capital per worker from
the growth rate of GDP per worker.
We run the following two regressions in each of our three samples:
ln(kit+10/kit)/10 = αi + ρ t + β lnyit + γsit,t−4 + ²it. (8)
ln(TFP it+10/TFPit)/10 = αi + ρ t + β lnyit + γsit,t−4 + ²it. (9)
Table 4 contains the estimates from this exercise. Columns 4 through 6 correspond to
regression (8) while columns 7 through 9 correspond to regression (9). The main ﬁnding from
this exercise is that the positive association between lagged savings and growth observed in
the overall sample and in the sample of poor countries is entirely driven by the association
between lagged savings and TFP growth. For the entire sample, an increase in the average
saving rate between t−4 and t by 10 percentage points is associated with an increase in the
average TFP growth rate between t and t+10by half a percentage point. In poor countries,
a similar increase in the saving rate is associated to an increase in TFP over the subsequent
ten years by one percentage point. In contrast to this, lagged savings does not have any
signiﬁcant eﬀect on TFP growth in rich countries. Further, lagged savings is negatively
associated to the subsequent rate of capital accumulation both for the whole sample and
for the poor countries. As we shall discuss below, these negative coeﬃcients may reﬂect the
negative eﬀect that in the neoclassical transitional dynamics future growth prospects have
on current investment.
Before moving forward with our exploration it is convenient to make a remark about
what the Solow residual measures. Since we have not adjusted the residual for human
capital accumulation, it is going to be captured by our measure of TFP growth. However,
we know since the work of Islam (1995) and others that schooling does not have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on growth in panel exercises such ours. Therefore, controlling for human capital
accumulation would not change our ﬁnding that the association between lagged savings and
growth operates through TFP rather than through factor accumulation.9
Stock vs. Flow
One simple way to improve our measure of the collateral in the economy is to increase
the length of the interval over which we compute the average saving rate. Next, we consider
how the estimates of the eﬀect of lagged savings on growth change when we measured lagged
savings by the average saving rate between years t − 9 and t (regressions 10 and 11).
ln(yit+10/yit)/10 = αi + ρ t + β lnyit + γsit,t−9 + ²it. (10)
ln(TFP it+10/TFPit)/10 = αi + ρ t + β lnyit + γsit,t−9 + ²it. (11)
9In addition, recent work by Comin, Hobijn and Rovito [2006] shows that direct technology measures are
highly correlated to TFP.
16The exclusion of the initial level of physical capital from this measure should not be a
signiﬁcant concern since after 10 years most of the initial capital stock will be depreciated.
In particular, with a reasonable 10 percent depreciation rate, only one third of the available
capital at year t − 9 will remain at year t.
Table 5 compares the estimates of lagged savings on growth when using 5 and 10 year
averages. The main conclusion from this exercise is that extending the period over which we
compute average savings does not aﬀect the eﬀect of savings on growth. For productivity
growth, there is a very small decline in the coeﬃcients for the three samples when we extend
the interval, while for TFP growth there is a very small increment in the estimated coeﬃcient.
This insensitivity of the estimated eﬀect of average savings on growth to including lagged
savings from the period (t − 9 ,t− 5) may provide some support for the role of savings as
collateral since one would think that savings at diﬀerent lags have a similar eﬀect on current
collateral.
Reverse causality
A strand of the literature on growth and savings has emphasized that the causality does
not run from savings to growth but from growth to savings. Most prominently, Carrol,
Overland and Weil (2000) have argued that if consumers have internal habit, in response to
an increase in their income prospects they will tend to save more to avoid the negative eﬀects
of a higher habit. This mechanism could, in principle, be consistent with our ﬁndings that
lagged savings is positively associated with future income growth and future TFP growth.
Of course, it is not obvious why this would happen more in poor than in rich countries as
we have found in our analysis so far. Further, one would expect that the response to future
growth prospect would be larger the more immediate are the realizations of growth. That
would imply that we should observe a lower coeﬃcient of savings on growth when looking
at savings between t−4 and t than when looking at more distant savings. That is not what
we have found in Table 5.10
The reverse causality argument, however, may still be consistent with the insensitivity to
the lag of savings of the coeﬃcient of savings on growth if growth is very persistent. If this
was the case, future growth would be highly correlated with current growth which would
trigger very lagged savings. However, we know at least since Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and
Summers (1993) that average growth over decades presents very low autocorrelation. We
also reach a similar conclusion when estimating the eﬀect of productivity growth between
t−9 and t on productivity growth between t and t+10after controlling for log-productivity
at t and including the country ﬁxed eﬀects.11
Finally, one way to evaluate the power of the reverse causality explanation is the following.
Let’s take an oﬀ-the-shelf model where the causality runs from future growth and lagged
savings, let’s simulate it and let’s run our regressions on the simulated data. Is the estimated
relationship between savings and growth similar to the one we estimate in the data?
A positive answer to this question does not imply that reverse causality is driving the
results presented so far because in the exercise we are posing a particular model that contains
10If we look at the association between average savings between t−9 and t−5 and growth (between t and
t+10)w eo b s e r v et h a tt h ec o e ﬃcients are very similar to what we obtain when having as regressor average
savings between t − 9 and t or average savings between t − 4 and t.
11If we do not control for log productivity at t,the autocorrelation of productivity growth is even negative.
17habit. However, a negative answer will make hard to reconcile the evidence with the reverse
causation argument.
We consider two models for this calibration exercise. First, we simulate a standard real
business cycle model with standard CRRA preferences separable in consumption and leisure.
Then we simulate a model with internal habit for consumption with exogenous labor supply
and exogenous productivity shocks. This habit model is quite similar to the model presented
by Carrol, Overland and Weil (2000) and it is described in more detail in the Appendix.
T a b l e6r e p o r t st h er e s u l t sf r o mv a r i o u sc a l i b r a t i o n so ft h e s em o d e l s .C o l u m n s2t h r o u g h
6 describe the model and the values used for the most relevant parameters. The Appendix
contains the values used for the calibration for the other parameters. For each of these
calibrations, we simulate 1000 50-year series and then for each simulated series we estimate
regressions (4) and (9). Column 7 contains the average estimate of the eﬀects of lagged
savings on subsequent productivity growth and the 95 percent conﬁdence interval for this
average estimate. Column 8 contains the average estimate of the eﬀects of lagged savings on
subsequent TFP growth and the 95 percent conﬁdence interval for this average estimate. In
addition, we also compare the relative volatility of investment and output in the model with
t h ed a t a . I np a r t i c u l a r ,w ea p p l yt h eH o d r i c k - P r e s c o t tﬁlter to each simulated series and
compute the ratio of the relative standard deviation of simulated investment over the stan-
dard deviation of simulated output. Column 9 report the average ratio for each calibration
together with the 95 percent conﬁdence interval of the average ratio.
Recall that the baseline estimates from our regressions above are: (i) 3.9 percent for
the estimated eﬀect of lagged savings on productivity growth in poor countries with a 95
percent conﬁdence interval of (0.0173, 0.06), (ii) 10.5 percent for the eﬀect of lagged savings
on subsequent TFP growth in poor countries with a conﬁd e n c ei n t e r v a lo ft h i se s t i m a t eg i v e n
by (0.078, 0.13). Finally, it is well known that in developed economies investment is about 3
times as volatile as output, while in developing economies this ratio is about 4 (Aguiar and
Gopinath, 2005).
The ﬁrst two rows report the estimate of the eﬀect of lagged savings on subsequent
growth in the RBC model without habit. In this model, we consider a value for the annual
auto-correlation of the TFP shocks equal to 0.8 (row 1) and 0.95 (row 2). As it is well
known, the simulations from this type of models are consistent with the relative volatility
of investment and output observed in the data. However, we ﬁnd that, irrespective of the
calibration and whether we look at the growth of productivity or of TFP, in this type of
model lagged savings is uncorrelated with subsequent growth.
Following the hypothesis of Carrol, Overland and Weil (2000), we simulate a model with
strong internal habit. In particular, a habit persistence parameter of 0.8 implies that if
the consumer does not change her consumption level from the previous period she will just
enjoy 20 percent of her total consumption. Introducing internal habit tends to increase
the consumer saving rate in response to expectations of higher income in the future. This,
however, does not have much impact on the estimated correlation between lagged savings
and subsequent growth once we control for the log-level of labor productivity at t.I nr o w s
3 and 4 we observe how the average estimate of this conditional correlation in the data
simulated from the habit model is negative when the dependent variable is the growth rate
of labor productivity and very small average estimates when the dependent variable is the
growth rate of TFP. In particular, for this latter case, the average estimate is less than
18one tenth the coeﬃcient estimated for the sample of poor countries (row 3). Further, row 4
illustrates one problem that sometimes arises in the model with habit. Namely, that volatility
of investment (relative to output) is too small. In this particular speciﬁcation this results
from the combination of habit and a high auto-correlation of the TFP shock.12
We next try to correct both of these problems by increasing the capital share to 0.7, a
value often rationalized with a broad interpretation of the concept of capital (e.g. Mankiw,
Romer and Weil, 1992). A higher capital share increases the return to current investment
and consumers save more in response to a productivity shock. This tends to increase the
partial correlation between current savings and subsequent growth. However, it also reduces
the volatility of investment relative to output. In our parametrization in row 5, this relative
volatility is of about 1.8. Even in this case, the average estimate of the eﬀect of lagged
savings on subsequent productivity growth is still negative (though very small). For TFP
growth, this eﬀect is about 3 percent while in the data, for poor countries, the estimated
eﬀect is 10.5 percent. Hence, it does not seem that the reverse causality of future growth
on lagged savings predicted by habit models is suﬃcient to rationalize the large observed
correlation between these two variables in the data. Row 6 tries to increase the relative
volatility of investment by reducing the auto-correlation of the TFP shocks to 0.5. This
increases slightly the relative volatility of investment but reduces to 2 percent the estimated
eﬀect of savings on TFP growth.
The last three rows of Table 6 explore the eﬀect of increasing the habit persistence. This
does not aﬀect signiﬁcantly any of the previous observations. Hence, we conclude that reverse
causality is not responsible for a signiﬁcant part of the estimated eﬀect of lagged savings on
productivity or TFP growth in the countries that are far from the technology frontier.
Omitted variable bias
Both savings and productivity growth are endogenous variables. Therefore it is not
possible for us to rule out the possibility that the observed relationship between lagged
savings and productivity growth is not driven by a third variable that is omitted from our
analysis.13 Though this is certainly possible, there are a few hurdles that the omitted variable
must pass in order to drive our results.
F i r s t ,t h eo m i t t e dv a r i a b l ec a n n o tb ev e r yp e r s i s t e n to rh a v eav e r yp e r s i s t e n te ﬀect on
g r o w t hb e c a u s ei ft h i sw a st h ec a s ei t se ﬀect would be captured by the country ﬁxed eﬀect
and would not account for the positive estimates of lagged savings on subsequent growth.
The relatively short length of our panel (25 years after removing the ten years over which
growth is computed and the 5 years over which lagged savings are computed) increase the
stringency of this constraint. Institutional and geographic variables are deﬁnitely rule out
from the list of potential suspects.
Second, if the eﬀect of the omitted variable on growth is very transitory, the exclusion of
the variable from regression (4) is still an unlikely source of bias because in our regressions
12This, and all the results discussed in this section are robust to varying the risk aversion coeﬃcient.
Typicaly, the estimated eﬀect of lagged savings on subsequent growth declines with the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion.
13An alternative approach consists on trying to instrument savings. Loayza, Schimdt and Serven (2000)
use dependency ratios, urbanization rates, income inequality, volatility growth and growth as instruments.
However, it is debatable whether these variables are exogenous.
19we control for the productivity level at the beginning of the period and this variable would
capture very transitory growth eﬀects from an omitted variable. Third, this restriction
becomes slightly more stringent from the fact that the coeﬃcient of savings on growth does
not decline when using the average saving rate between t − 9 and t as regressor.
Finally, the omitted variable should be more correlated with savings in poor than in rich
countries or alternatively aﬀect diﬀerentially growth in poor vs. rich countries. Of course, it
m a yb ep o s s i b l et oﬁnd variables that satisfy these restrictions and therefore we cannot rule
out the possibility that our estimates are driven by omitted variable bias. However, ﬁnding
such a variable is not an easy task.
Savings, ﬁnancial market development and growth
So far, we have classiﬁed countries according to their per capita income and used this as a
proxy to their distance to the technology frontier. The literature on development accounting
(Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997 and Hall and Jones, 1999) supports this exercise by
ﬁnding that a very large fraction of cross-country diﬀerences in income per capita can be
attributed to TFP. Further, Comin, Hobijn and Rovito (2006) show that TFP diﬀerences
are highly correlated with cross-country diﬀerences in technology adoption.
H o w e v e r ,i tm i g h tb et h ec a s e ,t h a to u rc l a s s i ﬁcation based on income per capita diﬀer-
ences captures factors other than technology diﬀerences. One possibility is that the income
gap reﬂects cross-country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial market development. Savings would then
be more growth enhancing in low ﬁnancially developed countries because would provide liq-
uidity to the capital markets and enable the development of proﬁtable projects that would
not be undertaken otherwise. Financially developed countries may access more easily to
international capital markets and, as a result, the number of proﬁtable projects undertaken
would not be so sensitive to domestic savings.
This story is a valid alternative to ours and suggests that there may exist an omitted
variable in our analysis that operates through the classiﬁcation of countries. This story how-
ever is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from ours because it would predict that savings is a substitute
for ﬁnancial development while our model predicts that savings is complement to ﬁnancial
development. To test which of these two alternatives holds in the data, we conduct the
following exercise. We classify countries by their ﬁnancial market development measured,
as it is usually done in this literature, by the private credit to GDP ratio. Then we run
our growth regressions for productivity (4) and TFP growth (9) in the full sample, in the
sample of countries with ﬁnancial development below the median ﬁnancial development in
the year, and for the sample of countries with higher ﬁnancial markets development than
the median. To reduce noise in the savings measure we use the private savings measure. In
particular, our regressor of interest is the average private saving rate between t − 4 and t.
Table 7 reports the estimates from this exercise.
The main ﬁnding from Table 7 is that the relative eﬀect of savings on growth by income
gap is very diﬀerent from the relative eﬀect by ﬁnancial market development. When looking
at productivity growth over the next 10 years, savings is more productive for countries
with high than with low ﬁnancial markets development. In particular, for the former the
coeﬃcient of average lagged private savings on productivity growth over the next 10 years is
0.03, while for the former is -0.016. The diﬀerence between these two coeﬃcients is statistical
20signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. This is illustrated by the last row where we report the
p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that the eﬀect of savings on growth is the same
for high and low ﬁnancially developed countries. For TFP growth (columns 5 and 6), we
also ﬁnd that private savings is associated with a larger growth eﬀect for highly ﬁnancially
developed countries than for countries with low ﬁnancial development. The association of
private savings and TFP growth for the latter is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. The
diﬀerence in the eﬀects of savings on TFP growth for countries with high vs. low ﬁnancial
development is also statistically signiﬁcant.14 This conclusion also implies that, as predicted
by our model, ﬁnancial development is complementary to domestic private savings.
4.1 Evidence on the mechanisms
So far we have explored various predictions of our model using the reduced form relationship
between savings and growth. To build a stronger body of evidence in support of the mech-
anisms emphasized by our model we explore the role of savings on foreign direct investment
and on the imports of high-tech equipment. We also explore how these variables aﬀect the
reduced form relationship between lagged savings and growth.
FDI, savings and growth
The action that the foreign investor takes in our model may have multiple interpretations.
The most straightforward interpretation of her investment is foreign direct investment (FDI).
However, her input could also be a service such as technical advice, a sale of certain equipment
in advantageous terms or, more generally, a contract for the provision of certain inputs to
be (partially) paid in the future. Most of these inputs, however, are harder to measure
than FDI. So we start by exploring the relationship between the average saving rate and
the average FDI-to-GDP ratio between t and t − 2 for those country-years where FDI is
non-negative (equation (12)). The regression also includes a country speciﬁcc o n s t a n ta n d
a time trend. As in our previous analysis, we estimate the relationship between savings and
FDI for the three samples (full, poor and rich countries).
FDI/GDP it−2,t = αi + βsit−4.t + γt + ²it. (12)
The ﬁrst three columns in Table 8 contain the estimates from this regression. Two
observations are worth making. First, savings are positively associated with FDI inﬂows.
Second, the eﬀect of savings on FDI is very similar for poor and for rich countries. Columns
4 through 9 of Table 8 also control for log of GDP per worker and for trade openness both
in year t − 3. Introducing these controls does not aﬀect the positive relationship between
savings and FDI.
A second question that we can address is whether FDI accounts for some of the estimated
eﬀect of savings on the growth of poor countries. To this end we estimate the growth
regressions (10) and (11) including the average FDI to GDP ratio between t − 2 and t as a
control. In Table 8 we can observe how the FDI to GDP ratio between t−2 and t is positively
14Alfaro et al. (2004) also ﬁnd that FDI and ﬁnancial market development are complementary in a growth
regression. In particular, they ﬁnd that, in a cross-sectional growth regression at the country level, the
interaction of FDI with ﬁnancial market development enters positively.
21and signiﬁcantly associated to both productivity growth and TFP growth in poor countries.
In rich countries, the estimated partial correlation between FDI and either productivity
growth or TFP growth is smaller than in poor countries (0.03 vs. 0.13 and 0.07 vs. 0.1) and
statistically insigniﬁcant. This ﬁnding is consistent with our theory since it predicts that
FDI in countries that are far from the frontier embodies a larger technology transfer than
for countries that are close to the technological frontier.
F D Ii so n eo ft h ep o s s i b l ew a y si nw h i c ht h ef o r e i g ne n t r e p r e n e u rc a nh e l pd o m e s t i c
producers catch up with the frontier. Our model predicts that savings matters for growth
because it facilitates this technology transfer through its role as collateral. Therefore, one
implication of our theory is that the inclusion of FDI in the control set should reduce the
estimated eﬀect of savings on growth. This prediction is also borne by the data as is shown
in Table 9. Controlling for FDI reduces the estimated eﬀect of lagged savings on the pro-
ductivity growth of countries far from the frontier from 0.039 to 0.014. This estimate is
statistically insigniﬁcant. Similarly, FDI reduced the coeﬃcient of savings on TFP growth
in poor countries by 3.5 percentage points (from 0.105 to 0.07).
Finally, note that, the decline in the growth eﬀect of savings after controlling for FDI is
substantially smaller in rich than in poor countries (0.008 vs. 0.025 for productivity growth
and 0.012 vs. 0.034). All this seems to suggest that, as the model predicts, an important
part of the diﬀerential eﬀect of savings on growth for poor countries operates through the
inﬂow of FDI which has a much higher return for poor than for rich countries.
Equipment Imports, savings and growth
In our model, the input provided by the foreign investor helps domestic producers to
adopt better technologies. Many of these technologies are embodied in imported equipment.
Hence, we can test the prediction that domestic savings will have a diﬀerential positive eﬀect
in the import of high-tech equipment for poor vs. rich countries. Caselli and Wilson (2004)
have measured the technological sophistication of imports by the amount of R&D that they
embody. For each of nine categories of equipment, they measure the total R&D expenses in
the world and compute the share of total equipment R&D that corresponds to each category.
We follow their lead and come out with a measure of the equipment import share weighted by







where imjit is the share in GDP of the imports of equipment type j in country i at year t,
and R&Dj denotes the total world R&D expenses in equipment type j.15 The share of R&D
expenses in a given equipment category in total R&D expenses is roughly constant since
1960. So we decide to use as weights the average share during the 1960-2000 period.
As with FDI, the ﬁrst prediction of the model that we test is whether, the eﬀect of
savings on our measure of equipment imports is larger for poor than for rich countries. In
15The results we report below are robust to replacing eimit by the share of equipment imports in GDP or
by the R&D weighted share of equipment imports in total imports.
22this regression it is very natural to control for the imports share since countries with a higher
import share will also tend to have a larger share of equipment imports in GDP.16
eimit−2,t = αi + βsit−4.t + ρ imit−2,t + γt + ²it (13)
Table 10 reports the estimates from regression (13). As predicted by the theory, savings
in poor countries is positively associated with the R&D weighted share of equipment imports
in GDP. In particular, a ten percentage point increase in the average saving rate between
t − 4 and t is associated with an increase in our R&D weighted equipment imports share
measure by 8.5 percentage points in countries that are far from the frontier. This eﬀect is
also statistically signiﬁcant. Interestingly, the eﬀect of savings on the equipment imports
share for rich countries is not only smaller than for poor countries but negative. Columns
4 through 6 of Table 10 report the estimates from regression (13) after including the log
o fi n c o m ep e rw o r k e ra tt − 3. Controlling for initial income does not aﬀect the signs or
magnitudes of the association between savings and equipment imports for any of the three
samples.
Next, we reexamine the growth eﬀects of savings after controlling for our measure of
equipment imports. As discussed above, our theory predicts that the eﬀect of savings on
growth in countries far from the technological frontier operates in an important part through
the import of more sophisticated equipment. To explore whether this may be the case in the
data we include our measure of equipment imports weighted by R&D over GDP in the control
set for equation (4). A few interesting remarks are in place from the estimates reported in
Table 11. First, as with FDI, the growth eﬀe c to fe q u i p m e n ti m p o r t si sl a r g e rf o rp o o r
than for rich countries. In particular, the association between our measure of equipment
imports between t − 2 and t and productivity growth between t and t +1 0is positive and
signiﬁcant for poor countries but negative (though insigniﬁcant) for rich countries. Second,
the inclusion of equipment imports in the control set reduces by about a third the estimated
eﬀect of savings on the average productivity growth of poor countries. We take this as
indication that part of the eﬀect of savings estimated above operates through the import of
sophisticated equipment. Interestingly, controlling for equipment imports only reduces the
growth eﬀects of savings in poor countries. In rich countries, once we control for equipment
imports, the partial correlation between savings and growth increases. The fact that this
estimate does not decline, provides further support to the idea that the necessity of savings
as collateral to the import of sophisticated equipment holds only when countries are far from
the technology frontier.
We reach very similar conclusions when the dependent variable in our growth regressions
is the average growth rate of TFP between t and t +1 0(columns 4 through 6).17
16We obtain very similar results if instead we control for the degree of trade openness.
17After controlling for equipment imports, the coeﬃcient of lagged savings becomes negative and signif-
icant. The statistical signiﬁcance of this coeﬃcient, however, is not robust to controlling for the degree of
openness (import plus export share) instead than by the import share.
235C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have developed a theory according to which domestic saving aﬀects eco-
nomic growth even in a world of capital mobility. The theory is based on the idea that
technological progress in relatively poor countries generally requires a mix of foreign invest-
ment and local entrepreneurial eﬀort, which eﬀort cannot easily be observed. The foreign
investment is needed in order to transfer frontier technological knowledge to local innovat-
ing sectors. Saving provides the local entrepreneurs with coﬁnancing (collateral) which may
give local interests enough of a stake in the innovation projects to induce the eﬀort needed
to make the foreign investment proﬁtable. The theory predicts that saving should aﬀect
growth, but not so much in relatively rich countries that, due to their small distance to the
technological frontier, depend less on foreign investment to adopt new technologies. This
prediction is borne out by the panel of 118 countries for which we have data on savings over
the 1960-2000 period. In this sample we ﬁn das t r o n ga n dr o b u s te ﬀect of lagged average
savings on productivity growth over the next decade for poor countries but a signiﬁcantly
smaller eﬀect for rich countries. This eﬀect depends entirely on private savings, and operates
in part through the increase in FDI and the increase in R&D intensive equipment imports.
These ﬁndings have important implications for various related literatures. First, our
hypothesis provides a partial answer to the puzzling slow technology adoption process in
developing economies. Second, our model also explains when capital ﬂows to poor countries
and therefore it can be used to understand why the overall ﬂows of capital to poor countries
are so small. Finally, our model provides a rationale for the high observed correlation between
saving and investment in countries that are far from the technology frontier.
The theory and empirical analysis in this paper can be extended in several interesting
directions. One is to look at whether the observed relationship between saving and growth
f o rp o o rc o u n t r i e si sa ﬀected by other variables. For example, is the relationship stronger
or weaker in more volatile or in more stable developing economies? Another extension is
to develop explanations for the observed diﬀerences in saving rates across countries, that
would go beyond the diﬀerences in their growth rates and the causality from growth to
savings. For example, are the low saving rate in Latin America compared to East Asia, due
to higher income inequality in Latin America, or to the higher macroeconomic volatility that
has characterized this region since the 1980s, or to cultural factors to be unveiled? This and
other equally intriguing questions must await further research.
24Appendix
This appendix describes the baseline models used to explore the reverse causality hypoth-
esis that future growth prospects drive lagged savings. In section 4, we have calibrated two
models and run our growth regressions on simulated data. Next we describe these models.
The ﬁrst is a standard RBC model with CRRA preferences and endogenous labor supply.






where β =0 .95, ψ =0 .35, and lt is the share of time spend by the consumer working.
The production function is a Cobb-Douglas with capital and labor with standard shares
(1/3-2/3) and TFP is exogenous and its log follows an AR(1).









where σ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and ρ is the habit persistence. The pro-





where L is ﬁxed, α is calibrated either at 1/3 or at 0.7 and the log of At follows an AR(1).
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29Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Source
All Poor Rich
GDP per worker growth (t,t+10) Penn World Tables 0.018 0.0147 0.0213
0.0259 0.0286 0.0226
4148 2030 2118
Nominal investment/GDP IMF 0.211 0.193 0.231
  0.079 0.085 0.066
5109 2690 2419
Savings/GDP Penn World Tables 0.115 0.025 0.118
0.168 0.161 0.2057
5850 2935 2915
Savings/GDP World Bank 0.168 0.1223 0.232
0.145 0.156 0.098
5022 2903 2119
Private savings/GDP World Bank 0.163 0.119 0.208
0.099 0.104 0.069
2666 1345 1321
Public Savings/GDP World Bank 0.026 0.029 0.023
0.073 0.086 0.058
2713 1367 1346
FDI/GDP IMF 0.019 0.017 0.022
0.048 0.051 0.043
3977 2319 1658
Equipment Imports  Feenstra, Caselli and Wilson,  0.002 0.001 0.0039
adjusted by R&D content authors' calculations 0.005 0.004 0.006
6169 3941 2228
Private credit/GDP Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) 0.353 0.214 0.488
0.308 0.188 0.34
3602 1772 1830
SampleTable 2: Savings and Growth
Dependent Variable
log GDP/wkr t -0.039 -0.038 -0.049 -0.038 -0.04 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 -0.045
(14.25) (8.77) (15.31) (13.08) (8.83) (11.9) (14.11) (8.81) (13.74)
Savings Rate (t-4,t) 0.036 0.039 0.0176 0.034 0.028 0.012 0.038 0.032 0.015
(4.79) (3.6) (1.67) (4.6) (2.66) (1.13) (5.14) (2.99) (1.5)
Trade Openness*10       0.21 0.12 0.23
    (6.91) (2.25) (6.75)
Year*1000 -0.01 -0.14 0.32
(0.14) (1.3) (3.42)
Savings Measure
N 3674 1781 1893 3674 1781 1893 3674 1781 1893
Sample All Poor Rich All Poor Rich All Poor Rich
R
2 0.31 0.23 0.42 0.33 0.27 0.47 0.35 0.28 0.51
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test for equality of savings coefficients
p-value 
Note: t-stats in parenthesis. Errors corrected by Newey-West. All regressions include country dummies.
R
2 corresponds to the within R
2 from the fixed effects regressions without the error correction







Penn World TablesTable 3: Private vs. Public Savings and Growth
Dependent Variable
log GDP/wkr t -0.054 -0.076 -0.038 -0.053 0.077 -0.039
(10.06) (10.02) (6.3) (9.79) (9.95) (6.47)
Savings Rate (t-4,t) -0.01 0.033 -0.027      
(0.75) (1.87) (1.59)    
Private Savings Rate (t-4,t) 0.005 0.054 -0.034
(0.36) (3.3) (1.88)
Public Savings Rate (t-4,t) -0.035 -0.017 -0.012
(1.9) (0.6) (0.59)
Year*1000 0.6 0.02 0.96 0.6 0.03 1
(5.36) (0.12) (6.52) (4.76) (0.15) (6.59)
Savings Measure
N 1563 684 879 1563 684 879
Sample All Poor Rich All Poor Rich
R
2 0.23 0.32 0.21 0.24 0.33 0.22
Test for equality of private savings coefficients
p-value 
Note: t-stats in parenthesis. Errors corrected by Newey-West. All regressions include country dummies.
R
2 corresponds to the within R
2 from the fixed effects regressions without the error correction
p-value reports the p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that private savings has the same effect on growth for rich and poor countries.
<0.001 <0.001
Growth GDP/wkr (t,t+10) Growth GDP/wkr (t,t+10)
World Bank World BankTable 4: Savings and Growth, Capital Accumulation vs. TFP growth
Dependent Variable
log GDP/wkr t -0.039 -0.038 -0.049 0.034 0.057 0.022 -0.045 -0.062 -0.035
(14.25) (8.77) (15.31) (6.8) (7.99) (3.92) (14.38) (16.15) (11.23)
Savings Rate (t-4,t) 0.036 0.039 0.0176 -0.089 -0.17 0.021 0.053 0.105 -0.019
(4.79) (3.6) (1.67) (3.3) (4.68) (1.05) (4.01) (7.75) (1.83)
Year*1000 -0.01 -0.14 0.32 -0.35 0.13 -1.1 -0.07 -0.25 0.14
(0.14) (1.3) (3.42) (2.98) (0.88) (7.01) (0.78) (2.37) (1.49)
Savings Measure
N 3674 1781 1893 4619 2295 2324 3674 1570 1829
Sample All Poor Rich All Poor Rich All Poor Rich
R
2 0.31 0.23 0.42 0.33 0.27 0.47 0.35 0.28 0.51
Test for equality of savings coefficients
p-value 
Note: t-stats in parenthesis. Errors corrected by Newey-West. All regressions include country dummies.
R
2 corresponds to the within R
2 from the fixed effects regressions without the error correction
p-value reports the p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that savings has the same effect on growth for rich and poor countries.
0.045 <0.001 <0.001
Growth GDP/wkr (t,t+10) Growth K/wkr (t,t+10) Growth TFP (t,t+10)
Penn World Tables Penn World Tables Penn World TablesTable 5: Savings and Growth, Stock vs. Flow
Dependent Variable
log GDP/wkr t -0.039 -0.038 -0.049 -0.045 -0.047 -0.054 -0.045 -0.062 -0.035 -0.051 -0.069 -0.042
(14.25) (8.77) (15.31) (13.91) (9.28) (14.3) (14.38) (16.15) (11.23) (14.13) (14.85) (11.47)
Savings Rate (t-4,t) 0.036 0.039 0.0176 0.053 0.105 -0.019
(4.79) (3.6) (1.67) (4.01) (7.75) (1.83)
Savings Rate (t-9,t) 0.033 0.036 0.008 0.066 0.11 0.003
(3.54) (2.91) (0.51) (4.06) (6.4) (0.2)
Year*1000 -0.01 -0.14 0.32 0.01 -0.18 0.37 -0.07 -0.25 0.14 -0.1 -0.35 0.17
(0.14) (1.3) (3.42) (0.19) (1.44) (3.86) (0.78) (2.37) (1.49) (0.99) (2.82) (1.71)
Savings Measure
N 3674 1781 1893 3089 1476 1613 3674 1570 1829 2914 1347 1567
Sample All Poor Rich All Poor Rich All Poor Rich All Poor Rich
R
2 0.31 0.23 0.42 0.3 0.27 0.37 0.35 0.28 0.51 0.37 0.49 0.31
Test for equality of savings coefficients
p-value 
Note: t-stats in parenthesis. Errors corrected by Newey-West. All regressions include country dummies.
R
2 corresponds to the within R
2 from the fixed effects regressions without the error correction
p-value reports the p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that savings has the same effect on growth for rich and poor countries.
0.045 0.049 <0.001 <0.001
Growth GDP/wkr (t,t+10) Growth GDP/wkr (t,t+10)
Penn World Tables Penn World Tables
Growth TFP (t,t+10) Growth TFP (t,t+10)
Penn World Tables Penn World TablesTable 6: Reverse Causality?
Model habit autocorrelation risk aver. k-share effect of savings on Y/L growth effect of savings on TFP growth std(I)/std(Y)
1 RBC - 0.8 3 0.33 1.75E-05 2.98E-06 3.6958
(1.9992e-006 , 3.2990e-005) (-4.0253e-006 , 9.9934e-006) (3.6915 , 3.7)
2 RBC - 0.95 3 0.33 3.80E-04 1.75E-04 3.1175
(1.7423e-004 , 5.8542e-004) ( 1.0353e-005 , 3.3871e-004) (3.1135 , 3.1214)
3 Habit 0.8 0.8 3 0.33 -0.0054 0.0083 3.2192
(-0.0072 , -0.0037) (0.0067 , 0.0098) (3.2178 , 3.2206)
4 Habit 0.8 0.95 3 0.33 -0.0363 -0.0039 1.6706
(-0.0433 , -0.0293) (-0.0098 , 0.0019) (1.6704 , 1.6709)
5 Habit 0.8 0.8 3 0.7 -0.0024 0.0312 1.778
(-0.0074 , 0.027) (0.0269 , 0.0355) (1.7775 , 1.72784)
6 Habit 0.8 0.5 3 0.7 -0.0055 0.0209 2.1124
(-0.0086 , -0.0024) (0.018 , 0.0238) (2.1119 , 2.1130)
7 Habit 0.95 0.8 3 0.33 -0.0064 0.0099 3.7958
(-0.0077 , -0.0051) (0.0087 , 0.011) (3.7949 , 3.7967)
8 Habit 0.95 0.8 3 0.7 -0.0172 0.0297 1.8692
(-0.0218 , -0.0126) (0.0259 , 0.0334) (1.8688 , 1.8695)
9 Habit 0.95 0.5 3 0.7 -0.0106 0.02 2.164
(-0.0134 , -0.0078) (0.0173 , 0.0227) (2.1636 , 2.1644)
Each line correspond to a calibration of either a standard RBC model or a model with internal habit. Columns 2-6 describe calibration.
Columns 7 and 8 report the average estimate of the effect of lagged savings on productivity (7) and TFP growth (8) and its 95 percent 
confidence interval for the model calibration. Column 9 contains the average of the ratio of the standard deviation of the H-P filtered investment 
to the standard deviation of the H-P filtered output across the simulations and the 95 percent confidence interval for the ratio.Table 7: Private Savings, Financial Development and Growth 
Dependent Variable
log GDP/wkr t -0.049 -0.061 -0.045 -0.051 -0.068 -0.034
(9.95) (8.12) (5.87) (8.93) (7.66) (3.63)
Private Savings/GDP  (t-4,t) -0.002 -0.016 0.031 -0.048 -0.067 -0.0137
(0.17) (0.95) (1.48) (2.71) (2.83) (0.53)
  
Year*1000 0.77 0.4 1 0.2 -0.08 0.2
(7.23) (2.17) (6.87) (1.54) (0.38) (0.98)
N 1222 600 622 1222 600 619
Sample All Low Financial  High Financial  All Low Financial  High Financial 
development development development development
R
2 0.18 0.24 0.16 0.2 0.28 0.11
Test for equality of savings coefficients
p-value 
Note: t-stats in parenthesis. Errors corrected by Newey-West. All regressions include country dummies.
R
2 corresponds to the within R
2 from the fixed effects regressions without the error correction
p-value reports the p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that savings has the same effect on growth for high and low financially developed countries.
Growth GDP/wkr (t,t+10) TFP GDP/wkr (t,t+10)
0.013 0.032Table 8: FDI and Savings
Dependent Variable
Savings Rate (t-4,t) 0.12 0.14 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.13
(3.97) (3.01) (3.94) (3.43) (2.29) (5.41) (3.39) (2.43) (5.05)
       
log GDP/wkr t-3 -0.018 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.022
(3.05) (2.91) (2.39) (3.34) (3.03) (3.44)
       
Trade Openness (t-3)*10 0.18 0.2 0.21
(3.65) (3.71) (3.17)
Year*1000 1 0.92 1.02 1.1 0.87 1.3 0.96 0.7 1.3
(10.37) (6.24) (7) (9.35) (5.97) (6.79) (8.41) (4.81) (6.9)
N 2905 1520 1385 2702 1431 1271 2702 1431 1271
Sample All Poor Rich All Poor Rich All Poor Rich
R
2 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16
Note: t-stats in parenthesis
Errors corrected by Newey-West
All regressions include country dummies
R
2 corresponds to the within R
2 from the fixed effects regressions without the error correction
FDI/GDP (t-2,t) FDI/GDP (t-2,t) FDI/GDP (t-2,t)Table 9: Savings, FDI and Growth 
Dependent Variable
log GDP/wkr t -0.065 -0.061 -0.066 -0.072 -0.075 -0.6
(13.78) (9.78) (10.73) (14.86) (13.87) (8.85)
Savings Rate (t-4,t) 0.022 0.014 0.009 0.053 0.071 -0.031
(2.1) (0.93) (0.62) (3.45) (3.71) (2.14)
FDI (t-2,t) 0.09 0.13 0.035 0.06 0.1 0.07
(2.28) (2.38) (0.65) (1.76) (2.14) (1.25)
Year*1000 0.3 -0.2 0.9 -0.05 -0.5 0.6
(3.01) (1.48) (7.24) (0.45) (3.52) (4.6)
N 1847 951 896 1796 914 882
Sample All Poor Rich All Poor Rich
R
2 0.28 0.29 0.3 0.35 0.46 0.3
Note: t-stats in parenthesis
Errors corrected by Newey-West
All regressions include country dummies
R
2 corresponds to the within R
2 from the fixed effects regressions without the error correction
Growth GDP/wkr (t,t+10) Growth TFP (t,t+10)Table 10: Equipment Imports in GDP and Savings
Dependent Variable
Savings Rate (t-4,t)*100 -0.42 0.85 -1.1 -0.46 0.84 -1.2
(1.32) (2.78) (2.21) (1.51) (2.64) (2.57)
Imports/GDP (t-2,t) 0.012 0.015 0.011 0.012 0.016 0.01
(7.79) (5.49) (5.4) (7.34) (5.64) (4.9)
log GDP/wkr t-3*100     0.3 -0.01 0.14
(0.56) (0.1) (1.44)
Year*1000 -0.13 -0.1 -0.14 -0.13 -0.1 -0.17
(10.42) (5.77) (8.42) (10.36) (4.04) (9.15)
N 2021 786 1235 1990 776 1214
Sample All Poor Rich All Poor Rich
R
2 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.2 0.1
Note: t-stats in parenthesis
Errors corrected by Newey-West
All regressions include country dummies
R
2 corresponds to the within R
2 from the fixed effects regressions without the error correction
Equipment imports/GDP (t-2,t) Equipment imports weighted by R&D/GDP (t-2,t)Table 11: Savings, equipment share in imports and Growth 
Dependent Variable
log GDP/wkr t -0.056 -0.052 -0.063 -0.051 -0.055 -0.048
(12.06) (6.47) (11.44) (11.21) (8.49) (9.92)
Savings Rate (t-4,t) 0.041 0.027 0.037 -0.013 -0.047 0
(2.71) (1.01) (1.9) (0.81) (2.14) (0)
  
Equipment share in imports (t-2,t) -0.11 0.92 -0.22 -0.23 0.67 -0.52
(R&D weighted)  (0.07) (2.31) (1.35) (1.45) (2.18) (3.64)
  
Import share (t-2,t) -0.008 -0.03 0.004 -0.015 -0.047 0.016
(1) (2.03) (0.43) (2) (4.54) (2.5)
  
Year*1000 0.37 0.46 0.49 0.37 -0.47 0.08
(2.81) (2.19) (3.12) (2.81) (3.11) (0.59)
N 1574 647 927 1558 631 927
Sample All Poor Rich All Poor Rich
R
2 0.36 0.27 0.44 0.48 0.6 0.4
Note: t-stats in parenthesis
Errors corrected by Newey-West
All regressions include country dummies
R
2 corresponds to the within R
2 from the fixed effects regressions without the error correction
Growth GDP/wkr (t,t+10) Growth TFP (t,t+10)